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Liberalizing Agricultural Trade: 
Will It Ever Be a Reality? 
Alex F. McCalla 
The World Trade Organization (WTO)  Agreement on Agriculture was signed in June 
1994. It accomplished two things: it brought agricultural trade under the rules of 
WTO, and it set schedules for reducing barriers to trade under the three pillars of 
liberalization-market  access, export assistance, and domestic support. Nine years 
later there has been precious little liberalization. The new Doha Round has ambitious 
objectives for agricultural trade liberalization. However, given recent behavior by 
rich developed countries, it  seems unlikely that developing countries  will get increased 
access to Northern markets or reduced competition from subsidized exports, despite 
their now representing a majority of  WTO members. 
fiy  words: agricultural trade, barriers, distortions, improved access, liberalization, 
policy, protection, WTO 
Introduction 
Nine years ago, the  American Agricultural Economics Association Fellows Lecture had 
the title of "Agricultural Trade Liberalization: The Ever-Elusive Grail" (McCalla 1993). 
The lecture was presented prior to the ending of the Uruguay Round of General Agree- 
ment on Tariffs and Trade (GATT)  negotiations (1986-1994). The round was already in 
its third year of delay beyond the 1990 target date of completion. The delay was caused 
by an acrimonious standoff on agricultural trade between the United States and the 
European Union (EU). The Cairns Group1 of agricultural exporters was an aggressive 
ally of the United States, pushing to bring agriculture under the rules of GATT and to 
start  the process of liberalizing agricultural trade. The Fellows Lecture was pessimistic 
because it  was expected that another last-minute postponement of an agriculture agree- 
ment would occur (as  had happened in the previous two rounds-Kennedy  and Tokyo), 
in order for agreement to be reached on other issues under negotiation. 
An agreement was finally reached on December 15,1993,  the last day of United States 
"Fast Track" Authorization, and the treaty was signed in Marrakech, Morocco, in June 
of  1994. The treaty created the World Trade Organization (WTO) and formalized the 
Uruguay Round Agreement on Agriculture (URAA). Ex post, friends chided the author 
mercilessly on how badly he had missed the boat in terms of his pessimism. But was 
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Table 1. Selected World Merchandise Exports by Product Value (2001) and 
Shares (1990 and 2001) 
Exports 
Product Value 
(US$ billions)  Product Share (%) 
2001  1990  2001 




Total Agriculture, Textiles, and Clothing:  889  18.5  14.9 
Source: World Trade Organization, "International Trade Statistics, 2002," IV: "Trade by Sector." 
pessimism a mistake? Nine years later, despite the Agreement, there has been precious 
little agricultural trade liberalization.  The new Round of Negotiations, the Doha Round, 
is proceeding slowly, still trying to recover from the disaster in Seattle in November of 
1999. And the major force for liberalization in the last round-the  United States-has 
just passed a decidedly illiberal, expensive, and trade-distorting Farm Bill which, in 
most people's judgment, has made the United States an impotent hypocrite, never to be 
listened to again. 
So why should the topic be visited again, one might ask? Agricultural trade, as detailed 
below, is a small (c  10%)  and diminishing part of world trade. The major exporters are 
rich countries that can afford to pamper their declining numbers of  larger and larger 
farmers. Further agricultural trade liberalization  has always been a stumbling  block for 
a more liberal order. So why not say forget it, let the rich boys play in their subsidized 
playhouses while we get on with the other 90%? 
This would be a bad idea for three reasons. First, the rest of  trade--mostly manufac- 
tures and processed products-is  already substantially liberalized.  The impact on global 
growth, which was very substantial over the past 50 years for the Organization for Eco- 
nomic Cooperation and Development (OECD),  and other middle-income countries, has 
already occurred. Even though agriculture is a small part of trade, it is so distorted that 
liberalizing it would bring results almost as large as further reducing manufacturing 
tariffs (Stiglitz;  Hertel and Martin). If one throws in textiles and clothing, an additional 
piece of  the trade, equally distorted,  the potential exists  for real gains from liberalization. 
Table 1  shows the relative importance of  agriculture, textiles, and clothing trade in 
1990 and 2001. In 1990, these exports represented nearly 19%  of  trade, but declined to 
15%  in 2001. In 1960, agricultural trade alone accounted for 25% of world merchandise 
trade. Therefore, reason number one for revisiting this topic is that the potential gains 
from liberalization of agricultural (and textile)  trade are substantial  compared to further 
liberalization of  manufactures. Figure 1  shows clearly how growth in manufacturing 
trade has been substantially faster than agricultural trade over the period 1950-2000. 
The general consensus is that the reduction of  industrial tariffs, from an average of 40% 
in 1947 (GATT's founding) to a level averaging less than 5% in 2000, has contributed 
to the rapid rise in the volume of  manufactures trade. 
Figure 2, reproduced from a 2002 OECD report, confirms this growth. It also shows 
that agricultural tariff's post-Uruguay  Round approach 50%,  far  exceeding what industrial McCalla  Liberalizing Agricultural Trade  421 
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Figure 1. World merchandise trade by major product group, 
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~gcultural  tariffs 
1947  1962  1972  1987  Post-Uruguay 
GATT's  Pre-Kennedy  Post-Kennedy  Post-Tokyo  Round 
establishment  Round  Round  Round 
Source: Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), 
"Agricultural  Policies in OECD Countries: A Positive Reform Agenda" 
(November 6,2002). 
Figure 2. Tariffs and the growth of international trade 
tariffs were in 1947. Thus the scope for gains from liberalization are high because agri- 
cultural tariffs are very high, even though volume is smaller and declining. 
The OECD has recently summarized the  results of several model runs  which compute 
global welfare gains from agricultural trade liberalization, concluding: 
First, the potential gains from agricultural trade reform are large. Second, agriculture 
accounts for a substantial share of  the total potential gains from economy-wide trade 
reforms. Third,  most countries are likely to benefit.. .  .  Fourth, developing countries would 
be major beneficiaries.. .  (OECD 2002, p.  16). 
The second reason for continued focus on agricultural trade liberalization, as  noted 
above by OECD, is that the major beneficiaries of liberalization would be poor develop- 
ing countries, the very countries OECD and others target with poverty assistance aid. 
If developing countries are  to grow out of poverty, markets for the  primary products and 
their derivatives are  absolutely critical. Access to rich country markets for rural products, 
the majority of output in poor countries, is essential to their development (McCalla 
2001). Certainly, post 9/11, the  focus on reducing poverty and eliminating the  terrorism 
incubator of hopelessness and deprivation is higher on the  global agenda. Poor countries 
are still predominately agricultural, and agricultural trade is an  effective avenue to 
growth and poverty reduction. 
The third reason for sustaining interest in this topic is that the monetary stakes are 
large. To quote the President of the World Bank, James D. Wolfensohn: 
Rich countries must also take action to cut agricultural subsidies-subsidies  that  rob poor 
countries of  markets for their products. Farm support goes mainly to a relatively small 
number of  agribusinesses, many of  them large corporations, and yet those subsidies of 
$350 billion a year are  six times what rich countries provide in foreign aid to a developing McCalla  Liberalizing Agricultural Trade  423 
world of close to 5 billion people.. .  .  Yes, there are powerful political lobbieg aligned against 
action. But the fundamental truth here is that agricultural subsidies constitute a heavy 
burden  on the citizens of  developing countries and a barrier to primary commodity 
producers in the developing world (Wolfensohn). 
Table 2 documents Wolfensohn's case with selected statistics since 1985. For all 
OECD countries in 2001, support to agriculture was US$311 billion, while Official 
Development Assistance (ODA) was US$50.6 billion, or 16.3%.  Component numbers for 
Japan, the European Union, and the United States are reported. For OECD countries 
collectively, ODA  was 10.7% of  farm support in the middle 1980s, and has hovered 
between 16%  and 18%  in the 1990s and early 2000s. Table 2 also shows that the United 
States has consistently had the worst performance when compared to Japan and the 
EU, with ODA being 10% (*  2%)  of  spending on farm supports. Think of  the potential 
benefits of  $300 billion a year in aid, compared to the current $50 billion. 
The above discussion seems to suggest that agricultural trade liberalization may be 
a topic of  even greater importance now than it was nine years ago. Therefore, let us 
proceed with the analysis. The paper is organized as  follows. First, it reviews very 
briefly the history of agricultural trade liberalization and its  particularly torturous 
history in GATT and WTO. Second, it reminds us of what was agreed to in Marrakech 
on two fronts-bringing  agriculture under the normal rules of  trade, and reducing 
agricultural trade distortions. Third, it evaluates what progress has been made on 
liberalization since 1994. Fourth, the paper looks at  the current positions of  the major 
players, because trade liberalization has always proceeded better when it has had 
hegemonic leadership. This will lead to an exploration of the potentially severe negative 
consequences of  the U.S.  Farm Security and Rural Investment (FSRI) Act of  2002. 
Finally, the paper closes by revisiting the question posed in the title: Will agricultural 
trade liberalization ever be a reality? 
A Little Bit of History 
The paper begins with a wee bit of history. If readers want more, they can look at some 
of the author's earlier work (McCalla 1969,1993).  The last vestiges ofmercantilism  were 
wiped away by the repeal of  the Corn Laws and the Navigation Acts in the 1840s and 
by 1860, the United Kingdom was pushing toward freer trade. This ushered in the so- 
called "Golden Era of  Free Trade" (1870-1914). Agricultural protection was initially 
reduced, but as  grain prices fell in the 1870~1,  because of rapid increases in grain imports 
from the newly settled areas, many European countries began increasing agricultural 
protection again. Thus, while general trade was being liberalized, agricultural trade 
liberalization lagged or even retrogressed. In the post-World War I period, a rapid fall 
in agricultural prices made agriculture the leading sector in increasing protection. We 
all know what happened in the 1930s. 
Plans for better managing of  the international economy, post-World War 11, began 
with the Bretton Woods Conference of  1944, which created the International Monetary 
Fund and the World Bank, and ended in 1948 with the establishment of  the General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). GATT emerged after attempts to create the 
International Trade Organization (ITO)  in Havana failed in 1947.  The IT0  never made 
it, in part, because the United States was unwilling to put agricultural trade quotas on 424  December 2003  Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics 
Table 2. Farm  Subsidies vs. Official Development Assistance, Selected Years 
1985186-2001 
PANEL  A.  Support to Agriculture: Total Support Estimates (TSEs) (US$ billions) " 
Description  1986-88  1994  1995  1999  2000  2001 
OECD-A11  302.1  335.0  336.0  356.6  321.1  311.0 
European Union (UE)  109.6  131.1  145.0  129.8  102.4  105.6 
Japan  58.1  90.0  92.0  67.0  68.2  59.1 
USA  68.5  77.0  75.0  99.0  92.1  95.3 
PANEL  B. Net Official Development Assistance (ODA): Development 
Assistance Committee (DAC), OECD Countries (US$ billions) 
Descri~tion  1985186  1994  1995  1999  2000  2001 
OECD/DAC  32.3  59.1  58.9  56.4  53.7  50.6  ................................................................................. 
EU  and  Members  14.6  30.4  31.4  26.8  25.3  29.4 
Japan  4.7  13.2  14.5  15.3  13.5  9.8 
USA  9.4  9.9  7.3  9.1  9.9  11.4 
PANEL  C.  Official Development Assistance (ODA) as a Percentage of 
Total Support Estimate (TSE) (%) 
Description  1986-88  1994  1995  1999  2000  2001 
OECD/DAC  10.7  17.6  17.5  15.8  16.7  16.3  ................................................................................. 
EU  and  Members  13.3  23.2  21.6  20.6  24.7  27.8 
Japan  8.1  14.7  15.8  22.8  19.8  16.6 
USA  13.7  12.8  9.7  9.2  10.8  12.0 
"  Source: Organization of Economic Cooperation and  Development (OECD),  Agricultural Policies in OECD Countries: 
Monitoring and Eualuatwn, 2002  (and earlier issues). 
Sources: OECD, "2002  Development Cooperation Report," Statistical  Annex, Tables 2  and 4; and The World Bank, 
"World Development Indicators, 2002"  (also 2001). 
the table. Therefore,  GATT, from the beginning, had exceptions for agricultural quanti- 
tative restrictions and internal and export subsidies, at the insistence of  the United 
States. 
Agricultural trade was so contentious it was left off the agenda of the first four rounds 
of  GATT negotiations (1947,1949, 1951, and 1956). It was on the agenda for the fifth 
(the  Dillon Round, 1960-61) which was limited to the trade implications of the emerging 
European Economic Community (EEC), but little beyond binding oilseed tariffs was 
accomplished for agriculture. In both of the next two rounds-Kennedy,  1964-67, and 
Tokyo, 1973-79-the  United States insisted that progress in agriculture was a prereq- 
uisite to concessions in other areas. And in both rounds, agriculture negotiations dead- 
locked and agriculture was eventually pulled from the table so something could be 
accomplished in other areas. 
What  Was Accomplished in the Uruguay Round? 
Based on the frustrating stalemates of the earlier Kennedy and Tokyo Rounds, when 
the Uruguay Round began in 1986, the United States, plus the newly established 
Cairns Group of  agricultural exporters (McCalla 1993, p. 1105),  insisted on progress in McCalla  Liberalizing Agricultural Trade  425 
agriculture toward "substantial  progressive reduction in agricultural support and pro- 
tection.. .  ."  As we know, the conclusion of the round, scheduled for December 1990,  was 
delayed three  years before an  agricultural agreement was hammered out. It became the 
Uruguay Round Agreement on Agriculture (URAA), and was embedded into the new 
World Trade Organization (WTO). 
The URAA consisted of two parts. The first brought agriculture under the  rules of the 
old GATT, and the  new WTO. Agricultural trade, through the  many exceptions in  GATT, 
was heavily burdened by quantitative  restrictions (QRs&quotas,  variable levies, prohi- 
bitions, licensing requirements, and state  trading, to name a few. Export subsidies were 
widely used and sanitary and phyto-sanitary regulations were weak. Part One of the 
URAA required that all quantitative restrictions be converted to tariffs and be bound 
(binding  is a commitment not to increase rates in the future), and it  banned future QRs. 
Export subsidies were to be reduced and eventually eliminated. Domestic support for 
agriculture  was permitted, provided it  wasn't trade distorting, i.e., was "decoupled."  And 
a new protocol for Sanitary and Phyto-Sanitary (SPS) standards, based on real science, 
was adopted. In one Agreement, it seemed the rogue outlier-agriculture-had  been 
caught, reformed, and integrated into the mainstream of  civilized trade behavior. A 
major accomplishment indeed, if true. 
However, simply bringing agriculture under the rules would not bring liberalization 
unless tariffs, once established, were significantly  reduced, export subsidies were actually 
cut, and domestic support truly decoupled. Thus, the second part of the URAA was some- 
thing equally new, attempting to actually liberalize agricultural trade. However, the 
targets set for the so-called three pillars of  the agreementmarket access, domestic 
support, and export assistance-were  not very onerous, and countries have been very 
innovative in  how they have implemented their commitments. What was agreed is  well 
known: 
Market Access. All non-tariff barriers were to be converted to tariffs and reduced 
by an average of 36%  over six years, with each tariff line being reduced by a mini- 
mum of 15%.  If a country refused to convert a quota, a minimum access requirement 
of 4%, rising to 8%, over six years was required. Otherwise, a minimum access of 
3%, rising to 5%, was required for all products. The implementation mechanism 
became the tariff-rate quota (TRQ), which specifies a lower tariff for the access 
amount and a much higher tariff for amounts beyond the minimum. 
Domestic Support. Domestic  distortinginterventions of all sorts were to be included 
in a calculated aggregate measure of  support (AMS) and reduced 20% over a six- 
year period (1995-2001). Certain types of generic and non-distorting assistance were 
permitted (so-called Green Box); direct payments, if decoupled, were tolerated (Blue 
Box), but all others were to be reduced and, hopefully, eliminated (Amber Box). 
Export Assistance. Export subsidy expenditures were to be reduced by 36%  over six 
years, and the  volume of  subsidized exports was to be reduced 21%. Food aid was 
exempt, and export credits and state trading were not addressed. 
All of the commitments listed above were for developed countries; commitments for 
developing countries involved lesser targets and a longer implementation period. 
Implementation of the targets was left to the individual countries, with some general 426  December 2003  Journal of Agn'cultural and Resource Economics 
guidelines, which, it  has turned out, permitted creative interpretation. In sum, countries 
could behave very differently and still comply with "the rules of the game." 
So the bottom line on accomplishments of the Uruguay Round can be characterized 
as significant progress in bringing agriculture under the discipline of WTO rules, but 
very little actual reduction in protection that  would force countries to mend their protec- 
tionist ways and liberalize trade. 
"Progressn  Since Marrakech 
A quick review of what has happened since Marrakech is useful. 
Market Access 
As noted, countries had considerable latitude in  how they converted QRs to tariffs, with 
the predictable result that small quotas or prohibitions frequently were converted to 
very high tariffs. Tariff peaks of 100%  or 200% or even over 300% were not uncommon. 
Lawrence MacDonald of the World Bank presents several examples of tariff peaks: EU 
beef (195%), EU butter (161%), EU wheat (106%), Japan sugar (106%), Japan wine 
(84%),  USA ground nuts (121%),  and USA preserved fruit and nuts (114%).  Canadian 
butter tariffs are reputed to be among the highest at  over 350%. Developing countries 
which had few QRs and often no tariffs (they regulated by licenses or state trading) 
could basically choose any tariff level to bind. Many chose high binding, which then 
allowed them to vary effective tariffs below the  binding, just like the recently outlawed 
variable levy. Others bound their tariffs low in keeping with the spirit of liberalization 
(Valdes and McCalla). 
The following conclusion is  reported in an  excellent International  Agricultural Trade 
Research Consortium (IATRC) commissioned paper: 
Duties on farm products remain very high, despite UR  commitments to reduce agricul- 
tural tariffs. The global average ofmaximum permitted post-UR tariffs is 62%.  By the end 
of 1999,1,371  TariffRate Quotas (TRQs) .  .  .  had been notified to the WTO covering  a wide 
variety of both bulk and processed products (IATRC 2001b, p. iii). 
The bottom line is that protection rates in agriculture remain high, and through 
creative uses of high bindings and  variable actual tariffs, as  well as  TRQs, countries can 
still effectively  manage the  volume of trade, i.e., avirtual  quantitative  restriction which 
supposedly was outlawed. Finally, it should be noted that when all else fails, charges 
of dumping can be made, followed by the application of countervailing duties. This has 
become a more common practice. Agricultural protectionism is alive and well. 
Domestic Support 
The requirements to reduce domestic support were not onerous in the first place. In 
addition, the creation of the "Blue Box" for decoupled direct payments, not subject to 
reduction requirements, was a huge loophole for both the United States and the EU. As 
a result, the creative classification of policy and policy payments allowed most countries 
to meet their AMS reduction requirements easily. In  fact, with falling prices after 1997, 
most countries could increase support, as did the United States in its 2002 Farm Bill, 
and still claim to be within WTO imposed limits. McCalla  Liberalizing Agricultural Trade  427 
Domestic support is concentrated in a few countries (IATRC 2001a). In the EU, the 
MacSheny reforms of  the early 1990s shifted support from artificially high market 
prices to direct "decoupled" payments (Blue Box). EU support prices will be further 
lowered over time under Agenda 2000. The U.S. Freedom to Farm Act (FAIR) of  1996 
decoupled direct payments and was supposed to phase out direct payments over the  life 
of the Bill (by 2002). Of course, that never happened, as  falling grain and oilseed prices 
triggered escalating bail-out payments in 1998-2001, which were in excess of US$50 
billion higher than levels prevailing in the middle 1990s. To make matters worse, the 
2002 Farm Bill increased support authorization by more than US$70 billion by making 
temporary relief payments regular. 
There are indeed very few examples of rich developed countries actually reducing 
domestic support. One of these would be the Canadian abolition of export grain trans- 
portation subsidies. Other Cairns Group developed country exporters like Australia and 
New Zealand abided by the spirit of Marrakech and further reduced their domestic 
support to very low levels. 
But the  bottom line, overall, is  that for the  big spenders-the  United States, the  Euro- 
pean Union, and Japan-the  Uruguay Round Agreement on Agriculture has not been 
a constraint to doing what they want to do. 
Export Assistance 
The story on export assistance is similar. According to the IATRC: 
Export subsidies are still widespread. Between 1995 and 1998, WTO members spent over 
US$27 billion subsidizing  exports. Global expenditures on export subsidies by WTO mem- 
bers have been greatest for dairy products-accounting  for 34%  of the total 1995-1998. 
Officially supported export credits [not limited by the Agreement] can also act as 
subsidies if the terms of the loans are more favorable than those available privately. The 
use of export credits increased from $5.5 billion in 1995 to $7.9 billion in 1998 (IATRC 
2001b, p. iii). 
Export subsidies are most heavily used by the EU. Their recently proposed reforms 
would further reduce internal prices and reduce the needed magnitude of export subsi- 
dies. It appears that in the EU  the export subsidy limit was binding on a few commodities 
(Anania), but, in general, the Agricultural Agreement has not been very effective in 
moving toward the stated objectives of eliminating export subsidies. 
Troubling New Developments 
Overall, the results confirming actual liberalization are  limited, and some of the  out- 
comes seem, in fact, to go in the opposite direction. There are two examples worthy 
of mention. The first is the issue of decoupling. It is now increasingly understood that 
there are no truly decoupled policies (OECD 2000). Even payments based on historical 
area  planted, or historic animal inventories, have impacts on wealth positions of farmers 
and clearly reduce incentives to leave agriculture. While some changes in policy, such 
as the EU reform in Agenda 2000, may reduce direct linkages between payments and 
incentives to expand production, it  is  not clear the  EU reform represents a major change 
in production incentives. A recent U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) study 428  December 2003  Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics 
simulates impacts of a permanent program of decoupled payments, and finds  "decoupled 
Production Flexibility Contracts (PFCs)  would have a negligible impact on agricultural 
investment and production in the long run..  ." (USDA, p. iii). Thus, the evidence is still 
mixed on the quantitative impacts of "decoupled" payments, but it is clear they are not 
trade neutral. 
The second unexpected outcome has come from the invention and expanding use of 
the tariff-rate quota (TRQ). One of the "breakthroughs" touted in the URAA  was the 
establishment of commitments by countries with closed markets to provide "minimum 
access." The accepted instrument to implement this requirement was a two-tiered tariff 
system, where a low "in-quota" rate was applied to the quantity needed to meet mini- 
mum access requirements, while a higher (very  high) Most-Favored-Nation (MFN)  tariff 
would apply to "out-of-quota" imports. While the initial focus of the debate was on rice 
imports into Japan,  Korea, and Taiwan, use of the  TRQs has multiplied as  nations have 
discovered that with the second-tier tariff high enough, it works as well as a quota. 
Further, if the transactions costs of accessing the low tariff are high enough, even the 
minimum required level can be prevented from being imported. 
Abbott reports that as of 2000, the WTO had been notified of  TRQ adoption by 37 
countries for 1,371  goods. Of the 37 members using TRQs, 17 are developing countries 
who applied 305 TRQs. The remaining 1,066 TRQs are applied by 20 developed and 
transition (Eastern European) countries (note, included in that 20, the 15  members of 
EU are  counted as one country). Thus, the  first point is  that this is an  instrument seized 
upon more by rich countries; Norway alone reported 232 quotas, and 11 countries use 
more than 50 quotas, with all but one being developed countries. 
Second, countries have adopted a wide variety of administrative means to allocate 
within-quota access. The most recent analysis from WTO suggests the average fill rate 
(percentage of the "in-quota" amount, actually imported) is less than two-thirds and is 
declining-i.e.,  it was 66% in 1995 and only 44% in 2000 (WTO 2001). So the second 
conclusion is that this device, by increasing transactions costs, allows countries to be 
more protective than they committed to under the URAA. 
Third, countries joining WTO after the URAA  was signed, frequently opt to use TRQs 
as  a preferred means of protection. For example, China is using TRQs extensively. 
Analysis by Anderson, Huang, and Ianchovichina shows a mixed outcome. For several 
commodities-rice,  vegetables, fruits, and meats-China  is adopting "in-quota" tariffs 
designed to switch China from taxing these products to protecting them. On the other 
hand, for some other commodities-wheat,  coarse grains, oilseeds, sugar, and milk-the 
"in-quota" tariff adopted significantly reduces historic nominal protection  on these 
goods. However, the 2007 "out-of-quota"  tariff proposed for all of the noted commodities 
is above previous levels of nominal protection, except for oilseeds and milk. Thus, the 
China story is mixed, but the general trend seems to be moving away from taxing agri- 
culture toward modest protection at  least at  the in-quota tariff rate. 
Despite the apparent proliferation of tariff-rate quotas, they still cover only a small 
fraction of trade. As claimed by Abbott, the 4,993 tariff lines covered (1,371  goods, some 
with multiple tariff lines) constitute only 23% of the tariff lines of the countries that 
have adopted them, and "only 6% of tariff lines for all agricultural goods for all WTO 
members" (Abbott, p. 118).  Nevertheless, they are a distinctly illiberal device which has 
grown out of  a legitimate attempt to improve market access. They have been used 
mainly by developed countries (Abbott and Morse). McCalla  Liberalizing Agricultural Trade  429 
The Last Word 
Overall progress since Marrakech in achieving "substantial progressive reduction in 
agricultural support and protection" is limited, if, in fact, there is any at all. Further, 
the developed countries are  persistent in continuing existing measures and embracing 
new ones (e.g., TRQs). Developing countries have adopted a mixed bag of tariff levels 
(Valdes and McCalla). 
Current Positions of the May'or Players 
One of the other provisions of the Uruguay Round Agreement on Agriculture was that 
negotiations were to reopen after six years (in 2000) to evaluate progress toward actual 
liberalization and to push forward with further significant cuts in protection. Despite 
the debacle in Seattle in November of  1999, technical agricultural negotiations, as a 
continuation of  the Uruguay Round, began in 2000 and were proceeding slowly even 
before the Doha Ministerial Declaration in November 2001. The Doha Declaration 
formally focused agricultural negotiators on having comprehensive draft commitments 
by the end of 2003 and a final agreement by January 1,2005. 
So who will be the major players this time around? Since the WTO was formally 
created in 1995, membership has increased steadily and now approaches 150 members, 
the majority of whom are  developing countries. They have substantial interests in agri- 
cultural trade liberalization. Of course, the Cairns Group is still very active and more 
strident than ever, with most of its guns focused on its old ally, the United States. But 
whether the Cairns Group can snatch the leadership role is open to question. 
More likely, the old vestiges of GATT, where negotiations began bilaterally between 
the largest players, will not disappear. Thus, the positions taken by the two largest 
traders, the United States and the European Union, will be crucial. It is worth noting 
that historically trade liberalization has always been led by a large and powerful 
champion-in  international relations terms-a  hegemonic leader. Britain forced freer 
trade on the  world from 1850  to 1914. She tried to reassume leadership in the 1920s, but 
quickly retreated to beggar-my-neighbor policies in the 1930s.  The United States  missed 
an opportunity to assume the mantle when it passed the Smoot-Hawley Tariff in 1930. 
The absence of a powefil advocate for free international commerce contributed to the 
economic chaos of the 1930s. 
In the post-World War I1 period, the United States emerged as a world economic power 
and, except in agriculture, became a global advocate of freer trade, offering concessions 
in return for others opening their markets. The reductions in manufacturing trade 
barriers over the  last 50 years have been remarkable and have contributed significantly 
to global growth, as noted earlier. 
Agriculture did not really get on the GATT agenda until the United States, emerging 
in the post-war period as  a major agricultural exporter, attempted to exercise hegemonic 
leadership in the 1960s.  But in fact, it wasn't until the Uruguay Round, when the United 
States  took an  "all-or-nothing stand," that an  agreement was finally reached. Since 
Marrakech, the United States  has continued its rhetorical offensive in favor of agricul- 
tural trade liberalization, but domestic policy behavior increasingly moved in the other 
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So who will be the real champion of agricultural trade liberalization in the Doha 
Round? Will the Cairns Group emerge in partnership with developing countries? It is 
unlikely to be the EU, and certainly won't be Japan. The EU is committed to implement 
Agenda 2000 through 2006, which phases down support prices over time. Recently, the 
EU  Agriculture Commissioner,  Franz Fischler, has outlined a more radical reform which 
would sever the link between subsidies and commodity production and switch to a single 
payment linked to past payments, not current production. France, the largest beneficiary 
from the Common Agriculture Policy (CAP), is, as is predictable, opposed. But clearly 
the signal is that the EU is moving toward a nearly completely decoupled farm policy. 
This is not driven, of course, by a philosophical commitment to free trade. The driving 
force for change is the prospective escalation in budgetary costs of the CAP if it is not 
changed before EU expansion into Eastern Europe. While not yet a reality, these devel- 
opments likely portend less resistance from the EU to movements to liberalize trade. 
And what about the  United States?  The U.S. Trade Representative continues to press, 
as  he did at  Doha, for further agricultural trade liberalization. In  fact, the  United States 
position came out July 24,2002. It  called for the  elimination of export subsidies over five 
years, new rules on state  trading and export credits, and the outlawing of export taxes. 
Tariffs, using the Swiss formula to reduce tariff peaks, should be cut so that no tariff 
line exceeds 25% after five years. TRQs are to be expanded by 20% and the Special 
Safeguard eliminated. On domestic support, a cap of 5% of total value of production is 
proposed (U.S. Office of Special Trade Representative). The rhetoric is  not dissimilar to 
that of the United States during, and since, the Uruguay Round. 
But getting anyone to believe the U.S. Trade Representative is made immeasurably 
more difficult by the recent passage of the 2002 Farm Bill, which made permanent the 
ad hoc payments that escalated from 1998 on as farm prices fell. Further, the Bill 
re-couples payments by basing payments on current (or most recent) production rather 
than historical bases, and it re-ties payment to commodity production. It commits to 
spending in excess of  US$170 billion on agricultural support over the next five years, 
reinstates previously abandoned programs for honey, mohair, and  peanuts, and  it  poten- 
tially expands commodity coverage. No matter how it is viewed, the 2002 Farm Bill is 
illiberal in terms of trade, is expensive, and is potentially production expanding, i.e., is 
clearly not decoupled. It is perfect fodder for the Cairns Group and other developing 
countries to attack the United States, and it even makes the EU look better in terms of 
agricultural protection. 
EU Agriculture Commissioner Fischler lost little time in sticking the needle in. He 
was quoted in the  New York Times as declaring: 
It would be fundamentally wrong to  use the deplorable Farm  Bill as a pretext for follow- 
ing the American lead in returning to stone-age, trade-distorting agricultural policies 
[emphasis added] (New York Times, July 10,2002;  online at www.nytimes.com). 
Why  Is the 2002 Farm Bill Such a Problem? 
The author has been in the business of studying agricultural policies and international 
trade for a long time. Never has he seen a firestorm of criticism such as that fomented 
by the U.S. Farm Security and Rural Investment Act of 2002. Ann Tutwiler, President 
of the  International Policy Council on Agriculture, Food, and  Trade,  quotes a trade nego- 
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The U.S. Farm Bill has taken away U.S. leadership on trade reform and trade liberali- 
zation and it is the European Union that has the good story to tell. 
Tutwiler goes on discussing the U.S. Farm Bill, stating it would: 
.  .  .  nearly double the assistance to United States agriculture over the next ten years. The 
signal this sends to the rest of the world is unmistakable: The United States is not serious 
about agricultural trade reforms and it is not serious about agricultural development in 
less developed countries (Tutwiler). 
A lead article in the New York Times by Elizabeth Becker begins as follows: 
Less than one month after President Bush signed the new farm bill, agriculture has 
leaped from the back waters of  diplomacy to near the top of  the list of  international 
complaints against the United States (New York Times,  June 15, 2002; online at 
www.nytimes.com). 
Laura Tyson, Business School Dean and former chair of the U.S. Council of Economic 
Advisers, titles her June 2002 Business Week  article "The Farm Bill is a $200 Billion 
Disaster." In the article, she argues: 
This about-face has dealt a severe blow to American credibility around the world. Less 
than six months ago at trade talks in Qatar, Washington promised that phasing out 
agricultural subsidies and improving access for agricultural exports from developing 
countries to the United  States and Europe would  be priorities for  a new round  of 
multilateral trade negotiations.. .  .  The new farm bill threatens to kill the negotiations 
before they have even begun ('l'yson). 
Paul Krugman has had a field day with the Farm Bill. Even Dave Berry, the urbane 
humor columnist for the Miami Herald, lampooned the Bill under the title "The Farm 
Security Ad: Making America Safe for Mohair" (Sacramento  Bee, June 23,2002; online 
at sacbee.comX2 
Fifteen World Food Prize  Winners have blasted the Farm Bill indirectly, as  have vari- 
ous spokespersons  for the World Bank. Many academic colleagues,  like Sumner; Mussel, 
Mayer, and Martin; and Pinstrup-Andersen, have pointed out that the United States has 
lost its high ground as a leader for liberalization. Likewise, cartoonists have seized the 
opportunity to critique through humor-three  illustrations can be seen on the author's 
~ebsite.~  But the true coup d' grace was that Gary Trudeau devoted a full week of 
Doonesbury cartoons to lambasting the Farm Bill. The author's favoriteMother  Goose 
and Grimm-also  got into the act with a subsidized ant farm.4 
But, you ask, why does it  matter? Liberalizing trade, especially agricultural trade, is 
not easy and it surely creates losers as well as winners. The stakes are large and the 
path is difficult. It  requires political courage. It  requires a leader, or champion, who can 
both lead by example and be able to put real negotiating chips on the table. The United 
States played that role in the Uruguay Round and progress was made. The United States 
followed up with the FAIR Act in 1996,  which further decoupled support and over time 
The Berry article can also be accessed online at the author's website, http://agtrade.ucdavis.edu. 
See footnote 2, above. 
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intended to phase out income transfers to agriculture. The United States had the high 
ground and was leading, not only in terms of  rhetoric, but with real policy action. The 
subsequent behavior of both Democrats and Republicans eroded these successes. 
The 1996  Farm Bill was passed in a period of high and rising prices. In such a setting, 
it seemed easy to say, "Let the market take care of  agriculture." Farmers, of  course, 
were smarter. They went along in the short term because high prices and high direct 
payments were a nice package. Farmers knew if things "went to hell in a hand basket," 
Congress and the Administration would bail them out, as they have consistently done 
for the past 70 years. Farmers believe in rational political expectations, to the hilt. 
When prices started to crash in 1998 and continued down for the next three years, a 
Democratic  Administration and a Republican Congress, sitting on a building budgetary 
surplus, fell all over themselves to pass out more goodies. After three years of  steadily 
increasing  handouts to farmers, and a prolonged agricultural recession, Congress decided 
to make the largesse permanent for at least five years, and the President agreed. The 
2002 Farm Bill therefore regularizes payment increases in a transparent way instead 
of  the annual uncertainty that prevailed before. Nevertheless, the signing of  the 2002 
Farm Bill made the United States' continued leadership toward freer agricultural trade 
something of  a mockery. 
So  Will We Ever  Get There? 
So what happens next? Will we ever get to a market-oriented agricultural policy and 
freely functioning international agricultural markets? To  answer this question, the 
author first went back and reread his article from 1993. It was shocking to find that 
what was said then was exactly what needed to be said now, nine years later. It appears 
the prognosis was generally good. Quoting at length from the 1993 lecture: 
So agriculture in all likelihood will remain a highly protected sector in rich countries. 
Its economic importance, already small, will be further diminished by  these inward- 
looking policies. But politicians seem unwilling to risk incurring the wrath of avocal, well 
organized, and relatively wealthy minority when those who would benefit from liberali- 
zation won't come running to the politicians' defense. Politicians must see it as  a negative 
sum game. 
So in the end,  whether an  agricultural agreement comes out of GATT [substitute Doha1 
or not, it probably won't  make a lot of difference to developed countries who subsidize 
their agriculture. That outcome could, I suppose, put it high on the agenda of the next 
Round of  GATT [substitute WTO]  negotiations, if  and when they occur. In that event, 
we will have another wave of  boobs, articles, and conferences [and, I suppose, Fellows 
addresses] which, if nothing else, will create employment for future generations of  agri- 
cultural trade economists (McCalla 1993, p. 1111). 
It was these just-quoted statements that led to charges of  the author being overly 
pessimistic in 1993. A more liberal day must surely come. But it hasn't arrived yet, and 
what was said nine years ago is just as valid today. There is an old adage: if the horse 
you are riding keeps winning, don't get off. Maybe the author will be around in 2012 to 
give another "Older Fellows" address on the same topic. It will probably be a repetition 
of  the same story yet again, just a different date. 
[Received August 2002;Jinal revision received July 2003.1 McCalla 
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